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Over- and under-reaction to
transboundary threats: two sides of a
misprinted coin?
Christoph O. Meyer
ABSTRACT When states over- and under-react to perceived transboundary
threats, their mistakes can have equally harmful consequences for the citizens they
mean to protect. Yet, studies of intelligence and conventional foreign policy tend
to concentrate on cases of under-reaction to threats from states, and few studies
set out criteria for identifying cases of under- and over-reaction to other kinds of
threats or investigate common causes. The paper develops a typology of over- and
under-reaction in foreign policy revolving around threats assessment, response pro-
portionality and timeliness. Drawing on pilot case studies, the contribution identifies
combinations of factors and conditions that make both over- or under-reaction more
likely. It is hypothesized that three factors play significant causal roles across the
cases: (1) institutions have learned the wrong lessons from previous related incidents;
(2) decision-making is organized within institutional silos focused on only one kind
of threat; and (3) actors have strong pre-existing preferences for a particular outcome.
KEY WORDS Foreign policy; intelligence; knowledge; precaution; prevention;
risk.
INTRODUCTION
This contribution is concerned with two particular types of foreign policy
‘fiascos’ which appear, at first glance, very different and may therefore require
distinct explanations. The first type is a foreign policy under-reaction epitom-
ized by states failing to deter, repel or prepare for a ‘surprise attack’ by
another state, even though such an attack could have been foreseen and
means were available to avoid much of the harm caused at comparatively
little costs and risks. The second type is a foreign policy over-reaction, which
until recently has been less frequently studied and could be illustrated by the
case of states launching highly costly and risky pre-emptive or retaliatory
attacks against a perceived threat, even though the target of the attack was no
actual threat or any potential threat could have been addressed with significantly
less costly or risky means. When states and international organizations over- and
under-react to perceived transboundary threats and hazards that emanate from
or easily spread beyond a given state’s territory, their mistakes can have equally
harmful consequences for the citizens they mean to protect. We do not know
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empirically which kind of failure is more frequent, but the tendency to focus on
warning failures and under-response can lead to problematic prescriptions; ever
more warning, higher receptivity, better preparedness and commitment to act
early could lead to, first, costly over-reaction and ultimately paralysis, as warn-
ings will outstrip preventive capacities. Therefore, it would be desirable to ident-
ify a combination of factors or conditions that substantially increase the
probability of both under- and over-reaction and thus give greater confidence
to take remedial action.
It is not new to argue that failures of perceptions may cause either under- and
over-reaction in foreign policy since Robert Jervis’s seminal work on psychologi-
cal biases and recurrent errors of judgement in foreign affairs (Jervis 1976).
However, the extensive United States- (US-) dominated strategic surprise litera-
ture still tends to concentrate on cases of under-reaction to impending attacks
and treats insights about over-reaction as a by-product (Betts 1982; Kam
2010; Wohlstetter 1962). More recently, a number of authors have character-
ized the US-led war on terror as an over-reaction and highlighted its various dis-
contents, in terms of solving the original problem, but also in terms of creating
new problems on the way (Aradau and Van Munster 2007; Desch 2007).
However, this literature does not offer us a systematic theory of how under-
and over-reaction might be linked and the difficulties of successfully navigating
the boundary between them.
Moreover, there is still insufficient cross-fertilization between intelligence,
security studies and foreign policy analysis on the one hand, and the literature
on risk management, regulatory policy and emergency response to diverse types
of transboundary threats such as unsafe drugs and foods, flooding, climate
change, pandemics or financial system collapse (Bazerman and Watkins 2008;
Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). The lack of attention to these threats is all the
more problematic given the shifting and expanding nature of transboundary
threats and the concomitant rise of an all-risks approach to foreign affairs
visible in states’ national security strategies (Dunn Cavelty and Mauer
[2009]; on policy fiascos in the risk era, see Beasley [2016]). The recognition
and response to such threats pose particular challenges as compared to predomi-
nantly domestic threats (De Franco and Meyer 2011).
This contribution aims to improve cross-fertilization between scholars
working on warning failures in the area of national security and those
working on risk and disaster management in international public policy. In a
first step it develops a single definition of failures to deal adequately with uncer-
tain threats whilst avoiding 20/20 hindsight. It will elaborate which performa-
tive acts are most important to what might be called ‘calibrated prevention’ and
suggest a typology of failures that could lead to either over- or under-reaction. It
will then discuss how to search for common causes. The second section will put
these criteria into action by selecting six pilot studies and identifying three
common mechanisms at play in both over- and under-reaction cases: (1) insti-
tutions have learned the wrong lessons from previous incidents; (2) decision-
making is organized within institutional silos focused on only one kind of
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threat; and (3) actors have strong pre-existing preferences to act or not act.
These hypotheses will require more extensive empirical testing in future
research.
CONCEPTUALIZING OVER- AND UNDER-REACTION TO
TRANSBOUNDARY THREATS
How to define and conceptualize the phenomena of over- and under-reaction in
foreign policy? The existing literature on intelligence failures (Betts 2007; Jervis
2010), foreign policy mistakes (Baldwin 2000; Walker and Malici 2011),
success and failure in public policy (Bovens et al. 2001; McDonnell 2010)
and over- and under-reaction specifically (Maor 2012, 2014) offers useful start-
ing points. However, the literature also has limitations for our research question
and disagrees on the issue of whether objectivity in case identification and policy
evaluation is possible and desirable. Constructivist approaches to policy fiascos
(Bovens and ‘t Hart 1996: 10–11) highlight the non-linear, competitive and
ideational nature of the goal-setting process in policy-making, where the
meaning and valuation attached to policy goals vary amongst actors as well as
over time and policy failure seems to lie ‘largely in the eye of the beholder’ as
McDonnell criticizes (2010: 6). In contrast, most scholarship in foreign
policy analysis and intelligence studies starts from the premise that the identifi-
cation of failure or success is both possible and necessary, despite criticism of
using unsophisticated frameworks for such judgements (Baldwin 2000). Maor
aims to reconcile ‘the tension between the objective and subjective dimensions
of “overreaction”’ by defining it as ‘policies that impose objective and/or per-
ceived social costs without producing objective and/or perceived benefits’
(Maor 2012: 235).
However, the subjective/objective divide stands for quite different research
designs in terms of the sampling criteria for cases and the evaluation of mistakes
and failures. While it can be illuminating to better understand how and when
political actors, public and news media ‘construct’ foreign affairs fiascos as a
first cut, such an analysis needs to be juxtaposed with or followed by a scienti-
fically sound assessment of failure rather than substituting such an assessment
with subjective views of practitioners or publics. Scholarship can and should
provide a more rigorous, transparent, nuanced and cautious assessment of
policy successes or failures and their causes than politicians, journalists or
other experts with less time, appropriate training or awareness of cognitive
biases. This is particularly true for the study of foreign policy mistakes where
the risk of unfair accusations and attribution errors is higher than in domestic
policy because of greater uncertainty affecting analytical judgements and the
higher probability of unavoidable mistakes (Betts 1978). It also more difficult
here to identify what was known and communicated by whom, given the argu-
ments to maintain a degree of secrecy about man-made threats to safeguard
intelligence sources, methods and relations to foreign governments. More
encouragingly, scholars in this policy area will find it easier to identify a
C.O. Meyer: Over- and under-reaction to transboundary threats 737
widely shared agreement about the undesirability of the harm given its severity
and typically symmetric effects. Contestation in foreign policy tends to focus
more on the threat assessment and the means to be used for a given goal,
rather than the policy goal itself.
A useful starting point for identifying different kinds of ‘failure’ in foreign
policy is Walker and Maliki’s (2011) study of US president’s foreign policy mis-
takes. They advance a useful typology by distinguishing between mistakes of
omission (‘too little too late’) and commission (‘too much too soon’). They fur-
thermore highlight two cross-cutting dimensions in mistakes of threat diagnosis
and policy prescription (ibid.: 54). Using this distinction as a starting point, a
more nuanced typology appropriate to the study of over- and under-reaction
is developed below and used to select pilot cases (see Table 1).
Walker and Maliki’s (2011) first dimension of threat diagnosis is in principle
applicable to all kinds of threats and hazards, but should be further differen-
tiated into failures of probability assessment and misjudgements of the severity
and nature of a given threat. The accuracy of threat diagnosis, can only be
measured post-hoc, even though ex ante we can gauge expert’s confidence in
the quality of the available evidence coupled with past reliability of applicable
theories or models to interpret evidence. Genuinely novel threats are more dif-
ficult to accurately forecast, as theories could not be previously tested and may
Table 1 Typology of over and under-reaction with cases
Under reaction Over reaction
Timeliness
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not be applicable. Transboundary threats are more likely to be novel because of
the complexity and pace of the interplay between new phenomena such as glo-
balization, technological and demographic change, as well as the expanded
range of actors who can influence outcomes (Dunn Cavelty and Mauer 2009;
Fishbein 2011). Furthermore, domestic authorities face greater difficulties in
identifying relevant information (because of complexity), accessing information
(because of secrecy, linguistic barriers or remoteness), or validating it (because of
deception and lack of experience). These problems affect not only man-made
but also biological threats. In the case of swine flu, the World Health Organiz-
ation (WHO) accurately assessed the probable spread of the virus, but did not
recognize and communicate early enough that it was no more lethal than a
normal flu virus, thus causing over-reaction in many countries. While uncer-
tainty will always be a significant problem in foreign affairs, it does not imply
that associated risk assessment is futile or that cost–benefit analysis can be dis-
pensed with, only that the epistemological basis for probabilistic methods may
be fragile, contested or highly variable over time (Posner 2004: 175–87). So
while it may be easy to see that an over-reaction was caused by an error of
threat assessment, the real difficulty lies in deciding whether this error was
avoidable and at what point mistakes can be described as ‘failures’ in terms of
nature and scale.
Secondly, Walter and Maliki (2011) are right to attend to policy itself (‘pre-
scription’), but their focus on defence and security is too narrow for our pur-
poses and insufficiently sensitive to the ‘too little/too much’ dimension of
under- or over-reaction. It is proposed instead to focus first on the proportion-
ality of the response in terms of scale and scope. Some types of policy problems,
such as protection from floods or vaccination programmes, require a minimum
scale of response to be effective at all, whereas others may only partially fail if the
response is under-scaled. Over-scaled responses in terms of resource intensity
means not just a lack of efficiency in terms of marginal utility (Baldwin
2000), but directly reduce a state’s ability to mobilize sufficient resources to
prevent or mitigate other types of foreign or indeed domestic threats or
hazards to human life and health. The US War on Terror (WOT), including
the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, has been estimated by the Congres-
sional Research Service to have cost US$1.6 trillion with a narrow focus on
US military operations (Belasco 2014), whereas the academic ‘Cost of War
Project’ arrived at an economic cost to the US of US$4.4 trillion (Crawford
2014). Even without monetizing lives or life-expectancy gained or lost, one
can easily characterize this scale of spending as disproportionate in relation to
the risk of terrorism and compared to alternative foreign or domestic uses of
these resources. Secondly, a policy may be mis-designed in terms of scope
when attempts to tackle a given threat the effects are (would have been)
either counter-productive or create (would have created) significant displace-
ment threats and risks. It has been argued, for instance, that US practices of ren-
ditions, torture, unlawful detention and drone-strikes used in the WOT have
damaged the US ability to find allies and boosted radicalization and recruitment
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to violent jihadist groups. This conceptualization of over-reaction means also
that a fair ex post assessment of the proportionality of policy needs to incorporate
counterfactual reasoning about alternative consequences that result from either
action or inaction with given resources (Baldwin 2000).
The third performative dimension that is implicit in Walker and Maliki’s
(2011) typology but not separated out is timeliness. A diagnostic judgement
about the high probability of a state attack six months in advance would be
very useful for maximizing policy options but also very difficult, whereas the
same judgement is typically easier a couple of hours before an attack, when indi-
cations/signals are stronger but effective options will have dramatically nar-
rowed. Similarly, whether a given policy reaction is proportional often
depends on the evolution of a threat over time, its magnitude as well as its
nature: an overwhelming military presence may be appropriate during a particu-
lar phase of military operation but counterproductive at earlier or later stages of
conflict prevention and resolution. Similarly, countermeasures against pan-
demics are a race against time where the type of action depends on the
spread, mutation and lethality of a virus. Hence, we propose to focus on accu-
rate threat assessment, policy proportionality and timeliness as key challenges to
avoid either under- or over-reaction to transboundary threats. In reality, cases
will not map neatly onto each of the cells in Table 1, but may show the presence
of both kinds of mistakes at different points in time.
Building on these considerations we can now describe both sides of the coin as
failures to mobilize the available cognitive and material resources of policy-making in a
proportionate and time-sensitive way to the severity, probability and nature of a trans-
boundary threat. In the case of under-reaction, the failure lies in not acting early or
decisively enough given available knowledge and means, whereas over-reaction are
cases where action was taken in response to either an exaggerated or illusionary
threat or could have been realistically addressed with significantly less costly or
risky means. This definition does not necessarily limit our focus to one particular
actor involved in the policy-process: analysts, policy-planners, decision-makers or,
indeed, operatives involved in implementation. Scholars in intelligence studies
spent considerable efforts to distinguish failures of the intelligence community
from failures of policy-makers (Jervis 2010; Pillar 2011). These distinctions also
matter to the definition of appropriate criteria to assess whether a given action
was a mere technical mistake, negligence against professional norms, gross incom-
petence, or outright malfeasance, for instance, when senior decision-makers con-
sciously suppress, obscure or hide ‘inconvenient’ threat assessments.
The other important aspect of this definition lies in the words ‘available’ and
‘realistic’ in recognition of the distinction between ex ante avoidable failures and
those actions or lack of action that may have caused an over- or under-reaction
in terms of ex post cost–benefit assessments, but which were ultimately unavoid-
able given the knowledge, skills, instruments and conditions at the time – a
distinction often acknowledged but rarely heeded in scholarly works on mistakes
and missed opportunities (Tuchman 1985; Zartman 2005). Most public
inquiries launched after cases of ‘under-reaction’ revolve around two questions:
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attributing individual or institutional accountability (‘blame’); and learning
lessons about how such harm may be avoided in the future (see Bovens and ‘t
Hart 2016). The former task is not just hampered by the ‘politics of blame’
(Weaver 1986), but also arises from hindsight bias as human beings tend to
overestimate what was knowable and likely given their knowledge of what actu-
ally happened. A good example is allegedly plentiful and high quality early
warnings about genocide in Rwanda quoted in writings which, on closer exam-
ination, turn out to lack specificity and credibility, or did not satisfy basic
criteria to qualify as a warning (Otto forthcoming). Moreover, academic
works as well as public inquiries such as in the area of conflict prevention do
not sufficiently acknowledge uncertainty about what works in preventing trans-
boundary threats, including trade-offs, moral dilemmas and unintentional con-
sequences (Meyer et al. 2010). Indeed, some transboundary threats may be too
difficult to solve for even the most powerful states, regional bodies and global
institutions of governance. It is instructive that many of the lessons learnt
from the financial crisis of 2008 are yet to be fully implemented, including
banks being ‘too big to fail’ or reducing global and regional imbalances in
trade and capital flows.
When identifying relevant cases for the proposed pilot study we need not only
to conduct ex post cost–benefit calculations in the full knowledge of the conse-
quences and an assessment of the alternative causes of action, but also consider
the relationship between knowledge, means, time and threat properties. Using
the typology elaborated above, three cases each of potential over- and under-
reaction to transnational threats were selected according to the following cri-
teria: (1) equal coverage of both security as well non-conventional transbound-
ary threats; (2) states as well as international organizations and agencies as actors
(European Union [EU], Eurocontrol, WHO); (3) significant degree of news
media salience as a potential foreign policy fiasco. The first two criteria are
motivated by our aspiration to maximize variation on case properties and
thus increase the theoretical yield if common factors or mechanisms can be
found. The third criterion reflects a best case design as one would expect
foreign policy fiascos, especially those on the under-reaction side, to have tangi-
ble consequences that draw news media attention and trigger controversies over
who (if anyone) deserves blame and how to improve (on the attribution of
blame in media narratives, see Oppermann and Spencer [2016]). These case fea-
tures enabled also better access to relevant information about the performance of
different actors and stages available from public inquiries, official reports and
subsequent analysis in the academic literature. Hidden or forgotten foreign
policy fiascos may well exist, but given the novelty of this approach the contri-
bution starts from the low-hanging more visible fruits.
After the initial scanning for suitable cases according to the criteria above, a
pilot case analysis was conducted drawing on the preliminary or final results of
public inquiries (9/11 Commission 2004; Chilcot Inquiry 2010; Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission [FCIC] 2011; House of Lords 2015; Lord Butler
2004; WHO Review Commitee 2011: 7,), statements by the actors themselves
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(e.g. Eurocontrol 2010) and secondary literature. The evidential basis varies, but
filling all the information gaps through original research would have required a
highly resource-intensive process-tracing approach and, in some cases, the kind
of access to documents and witnesses that only public inquiries enjoy (e.g.
Chilcot Inquiry 2010). Space constraints do not allow listing all sources con-
sulted or provide more empirical detail from the longer case summaries that
were compiled to cover the different stages in the warning–response process:
collection; forecasting; prioritization; mobilization; and implementation. The
conclusions as to the type of failure should be regarded as preliminary, especially
with regard to the more recent cases. The cases are not necessarily identical in
their degree of failure, nor the extent to which key actors can be held accoun-
table for mistakes made in the process given available knowledge and resources.
For instance, US intelligence assessments of the WMD threat were on the whole
correct given the available information, but politicians cherry-picked and dis-
torted intelligence to justify their preferred cause of action (Fitzgerald and
Lebow 2006; Jervis 2010).
WHEN TO EXPECT UNDER- AND OVER-REACTION
What do we know about the factors that cause over- and under-reaction in inter-
national public policy widely conceived? There is no shortage of good scholarly
works on good judgement in foreign policy (e.g., George 1993; Renshon and
Larson 2003). Similarly, intelligence studies and political psychology highlight
biases in information processing and analytical judgements and provide advice
on how to compensate for them (Betts 2007; Jervis 2010). Similarly relevant but
hardly used in foreign policy analysis is the public administration literature,
which looks at crisis and disaster prevention, preparedness and management
(Bazerman and Watkins 2008; Comfort et al. 2010). The literature does not
currently agree on which factors matter most for appropriate responses to
non-conventional transboundary threats, but is also marred by the empirical
and theoretical bias towards studying cases of under-reaction. Within the
pilot case studies we systemically searched for those factors (see Table 2) that
according to the evidence examined were (1) causally important enough to
expect the scale and scope of the over-reaction to have been affected, although
not necessarily sufficient for avoiding failure per se, and (2) with at least two of
the three factors being present in all of the cases covering the over- and under-
reaction divide.
The distinctiveness of this approach becomes apparent when we reflect on
some factors with unidirectional effects. For instance, a high level of politiciza-
tion or mediatization of a given risk arising either from the news media (Boin
et al. 2005, 2008) or political actors’ strategies is likely to be positively associated
with over-reaction as it tends to exaggerate risk perceptions and paves the way
for extraordinary and therefore more likely disproportionate measures. Conver-
sely, a threat that is off-the-radar of the news media, public and political debates,
such as mass atrocities in foreign countries of no strategic significance, will
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attract less attention and resources from authorities and therefore makes missing
warning signals and hesitant policy responses more likely (Power 2003). The
other factor which is often considered as detrimental to good threat assessment
and proportionate response is uncertainty (Boin et al. 2005: 3–54). But insofar
as uncertainty can be considered a core challenge to threat assessment and pro-
portionate response in foreign affairs, it is questionable how useful this obser-
vation is. For instance, the advice to analysts and policy-makers to ‘reduce
uncertainty’ by taking more time to gather more information and conduct
deeper and wider analysis will simultaneously reduce the capacity of actors to
act early and effectively, thus making under-reaction more likely. High uncer-
tainty makes it also more difficult to identify genuinely avoidable mistakes.
H1: Vivid lessons learnt from recent episodes involving similar threats lead to
the over-application of these lessons to threats and scenarios which are in fact
significantly different.
A rich literature in international relations argues that lessons learnt from histori-
cal cases and episodes structure how human beings, including senior decision-
makers and policy communities, perceive reality. They tend to focus on
surface similarities (Khong 1992: 14; May 1973) between current and past
cases to fill in gaps in their knowledge to make sense and anticipate. Inferences
drawn from past cases can inevitably turn out to be wrong, but are more likely to
be wrong when experts and decision-makers over-estimate the similarity
between past and current cases. In all cases examined above, experts and
decision-makers held on to assumptions rooted in lessons learnt from previous
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cases that turned out to be wrong: national monetary policy was not able to deal
with the repercussions of the financial crisis and markets were surprised that
authorities allowed a major investment bank to fail; the swine flu virus
(H1N1) was far less deadly than avian flu, but more contagious; Islamist terror-
ism had ceased to be solely regionally focused and had developed the level of
organization, capabilities and intent to mount a major attack on the US main-
land; significant segments of Iraqi society did not respond positively to regime
change as Kosovo Albanians did in 1999.
In all these cases, experts as well as decision-makers based their assumptions on
previous experiences of either successful or failed crisis management. US central
bankers believed that they could handle a bursting asset bubble, given their
experience of successfully handling the fall-out from the Dotcom bubble burst-
ing in 2001, and paid little attention to the bubble building in mortgage-backed
securities (FCIC 2011). The relatively successful hunt for the perpetrators of the
1993 attack on the World Trade Centre, the fact that the bombing itself had
failed and the lack of subsequent attacks in the US gave the impression to
many experts that jihadist terrorism was a nuisance but under control (9/11
Commission 2004). Their experience with the avian flu had convinced epide-
miologists that a similarly lethal virus was very dangerous, but could be con-
tained by acting early and decisively (WHO Review Commitee 2011). And
policy-makers in the UK learned from the intervention in Kosovo that
regime change can be accomplished militarily and that a successful aftermath
would bring around initially hostile public opinion and opposed members of
the United Nations (UN) Security Council. In the case of Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine, the EU Commission largely modelled its Neighbourhood
Policy on the Eastern enlargement process of the EU. This resulted in over-
applying a template designed for different circumstances and played an impor-
tant role in underestimating the political vulnerabilities of Ukraine, as well as
the risk of robust push-back from Russia (MacFarlane and Menon 2014:
96–7).
The experience of failure tends to lead to assumptions supportive of higher
sensitivity to threats that look broadly similar, whereas success inspires confi-
dence of being in control of these risks. The greater the sense of failure or,
indeed, success in these episodes of crisis learning, the greater the probability
that the lessons learnt will be over-applied to threats that may appear at first
glance familiar, even when they are in fact different. This is partly because pre-
vious experiences constitute an availability heuristic that makes key actors
remember more vividly those episodes that, for all kinds of reasons, caused
stress and highly emotive reactions (Kahneman et al. 1982: 14). Furthermore,
successful crisis managements tends to create complacency within institutions
and leaders and to prolong the tenure of key decision-makers who have seen
their previous judgements validated, whereas visible failure sparks critique
and can empower the previously ignored ‘doomsayers’. These may not be
better at forecasting, just more disposed to pessimism. The net effect of
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personnel change and higher risk sensitivity could be a pendulum swing from
under- to over-reaction.
H2: If threats are managed within rigid institutional silos, it is more likely
that novel threats will be either missed or inappropriately dealt with by estab-
lished diagnostic and policy routines.
Any system of risk governance experiences tensions between allocating the
responsibility for preventive policy to one particular part of the administration
and the challenge of evaluating risks that arise from either action or inaction
of other units. Risk myopia can develop as a result of the inability of the exist-
ing institutional configuration to cope with the cross-cutting nature of the
risks associated with either action or inaction. The problem is not the allo-
cation of responsibility to one organizational unit per se, but the inability
of that particular unit to develop ways of sharing information and consulting
with relevant units within and outside the organization to accurately identify
and assess novel risks, but also understand the wider impact of their potential
responses. The problem of institutional silos for risk management and preven-
tion is still relatively new to the study of foreign policy, although it is well-
recognized in studies of disasters (Bazerman and Watkins 2008: 102–3;
Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).
We have seen that bodies specialized in one particular area of risk, such as the
WHO or national health ministries in the case of swine flu, failed to properly
appreciate the economic and political costs of disproportionate preventive
action and were thus biased in their approach to calibrating their responses.
A similar phenomenon could be seen in the decision by civil aviation authorities
led by Eurocontrol to completely close Northern European airspace in response
to the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull on 14 April 2010;
initially invoking the zero-risk regulatory approach designed for a different situ-
ation and manifested in the long-standing guidance of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) to avoid ash clouds, regardless of any concen-
tration thresholds, average daily flights dropped by more than 80 per cent in
three days (Alemanno 2011: 3–4), disrupting the travel plans of 10 million pas-
sengers and costing the industry in excess of US$1.7 billion (Eurocontrol 2010).
As the human and economic cost of this blanket ban became increasingly appar-
ent, the authorities changed how ash clouds and their concentration was
measured and allowed air travel to gradually resume, depending on three
zones of ash cloud concentration five days after the eruption.
Similarly, defence ministries have been traditionally focused on the survival
of the state and its population against the risk of state attacks, including
nuclear war. They are used to assess the risk posed by actual or potential
enemies, but they have neither the habit nor the competence of conducting
a more wide-ranging risk assessment of their own actions and consider sys-
tematically unintended consequences. By concentrating deliberation about
and planning for the invasion of Iraq in the Pentagon, decision-makers
missed out on relevant expertise in the State Department relating to risks
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of sectarian violence in Iraq and an interest in avoiding damage to US repu-
tation. Similarly, in the case of Ukraine, the EU Commission’s Directorate
General (DG) for Trade had the lead role in conducting the negotiations
with Ukraine over the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
(DCFTA) as part of the overall Association Agreement (AA), treating the
DCFTA as just another FTA with attention focused on technical economic
and legal issues, rather than a wider appreciation of the geopolitical and secur-
ity risks (Smith 2014: 594). This under-appreciation could have been avoided
by stronger internal co-ordination with the European External Action Service
(EEAS), as well as more involvement of the Council of Ministers and repre-
sentatives from EU member states with substantial expertise of Russia.
While over-reaction is more probable when institutional responsibilities for
preventive policy are all allocated to the same unit, the risk of under-reaction
often arises from the lack of institutional links between risk monitoring and
management. A key problem in the lack of appropriate regulation of systemic
financial risk was the underlap between different national and international
financial regulators in monitoring the stability of increasingly interconnected
financial systems. Within financial institutions themselves, the units responsible
for monitoring institutional risk exposure were often unaware of the highly
specialized work done in those small units of banks that devised the highly prof-
itable but also very risky products (Tett 2011). The 9/11 attacks were facilitated
by an underlap in institutional responsibilities between the Federal Bureau of
Intelligence (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for monitoring
and countering threats to the US homeland arising from international terrorism
(9/11 Commission 2004). Recognizing and dealing with novel risks or novel
responses to risks will always be a challenge to existing institutional configur-
ations, but silo mentalities within and across institutions make blind-spots in
risk monitoring, management and response more probable.
H3: If the consequences of acting or not acting against a particular threat are
highly salient for senior decision-makers, they are likely to misinterpret
threats and mis-design policy responses.
We know from experiments that human beings are prone to be affected in
their judgments of a phenomenon by their feelings relating to the ‘goodness’
or ‘badness’ of it (Finucane et al. 2000). These feelings influence judgments in
a way that risks and benefits will be inversely correlated – so that a phenom-
enon, which is seen as very risky cannot be associated with benefits, while a
phenomenon seen as beneficial leads actors to downplay the associated risks.
These so-called affect heuristics, including the specific case of optimistic bias
(Armor and Taylor 2002), play an important role in explaining extreme out-
comes like wishful thinking or denial. In the cases of over- and under-reaction
examined, we can find evidence that actors’ strong political or financial pre-
ferences affected their balancing judgments. Such motivational biases can not
only arise from the impact of the threat itself, but also from internal or
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external incentive structures such as career advancement, anticipated blame or
legal liability.
One case is the inflated rating given by Credit Rating Agencies (CRA) for
complex structured products involving sub-prime mortgages in the run up to
2008 (see Kruck 2016). The ‘issuer-pays model’, coupled with insufficient com-
petition among agencies and a high fraction of income from such products,
created a systemic conflict of interest in favour of analysts being overconfident
in their technical ability to devise highly rated products for satisfied clients and
thus attract further business from these clients (Mathis et al. 2009). It also made
CRAs less open to internal sceptics just as some chief executive officers (CEOs)
of banks were not open to warnings that the products they currently made con-
siderable profits from could soon become a major source of loss (Tett 2011). In
the case of swine flu, different factors were pushing in the same direction of early
and vigorous action, such as the prevailing ethos to save lives by planning for the
worst, coupled with subtle and undisclosed conflicts of interests affecting experts
on influential WHO and national advisory committees (Cohen and Charter
2010). In the run-up to the 9/11 attacks, warnings about al-Qaeda were not
welcome, since they appeared as a circumspect distraction to the foreign
policy agenda of the new administration (Clarke 2004). Motivational biases
are also visible in the planning of the Iraq invasion, which saw not only
worst-case thinking about the risks posed by inaction, but also wishful thinking
about the aftermath of regime change (Fitzgerald and Lebow 2006). In the case
of Ukraine, one significant reason for why the EU underestimated the strain on
the Yanukovych government arising from the Association Agreement and, sub-
sequently, the Russian reaction to its fall, was firstly the desire to reach a success-
ful conclusion to the long-standing negotiations over the Association Agreement
(Smith 2014: 594), as well as the strong ideational support for the goals of the
Euromaidan (House of Lords 2015).
We expect motivational biases to be particularly pronounced in settings
where changing threat assessments and acting or not acting on a given risk
has significant redistributive consequences, as in the case of the CRAs in
the run up to the financial crisis. In the area of conventional foreign
policy, positive or negative biases in the processing of warning signals may
arise from balance-of-threat calculations in which policy-makers interpret
potential preventive action from the perspective of whether it will strengthen
or weaken potential rivals and enemies. International regulators are concerned
about the consequences of being blamed for failures to act by their principals
as well as external pressure groups. While a complete lack of external scrutiny
can induce regulators to become complacent and more easily captured by sta-
keholders, extremely strong scrutiny that is averse to even the smallest risks
can lead risk regulators to prioritize action to avoid blame, even if this
action created new kinds of risks in other areas.
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CONCLUSION
The contribution aimed at advancing our understanding of over- and under-
reaction towards transboundary threats which pose specific challenges in
terms of diagnosis and appropriate response. In contrast to the strategic surprise
literature in intelligence studies and foreign policy analysis, it has been argued
that over- and under-reaction are not completely distinct phenomena that
require idiosyncratic explanations, but can be understood as inter-related fail-
ures in threat assessment, proportional response and timeliness. This approach
places a greater emphasis on a substantive and in-depth assessment of performa-
tive acts of various actors in foreign policy-making, rather than a more narrow
focus on either the legislative process as in some of the public policy literature
(Marsh and Donnell 2010) or on senior decision-makers as in many studies of
foreign policy performance (Walker and Malici 2011). The typology developed
is sensitive to the risk of hindsight bias in ex post assessments of diagnostic jud-
gements, as well as the need for counterfactual reasoning when assessing alterna-
tive choices and displacements risks. A second advantage to most of the
literature in intelligence studies and foreign policy judgements lies in its wide
applicability across institutional contexts (regulators, business, intelligence)
and types of risks (violence, health, finance), and therefore its ability to highlight
the generic problems modern government faces when trying to implement an
all-risk approach to transboundary threats.
The second contribution of the article lies in identifying common causes of
over- and under-reaction within six pilot studies. We have focused on the
three factors common to all cases examined: (1) misapplied lessons learnt
from recent vivid crises; (2) the rigidity of institutional silos, and finally (3)
the strength of actor preferences in relation to the expected outcome of preven-
tive action. It is their cumulative effects rather than the presence of a single
factor, which can be expected to tilt the key judgments in a particular direction
and to substantially increase the risk of over- or under-reaction. We do not
claim that any of these factors are completely novel to the study of international
relations and public policy, but our approach breaks new ground by linking
these factors specifically to the challenge of avoiding both over- and under-reac-
tion in foreign policy and shows their applicability to a wider range of threats.
Even though over- or under-reaction cannot be eradicated, those instances
that could be classed as avoidable mistakes or outright disasters can be made
less likely by monitoring for and, if possible, mitigating against the three
factors. As a first step, practitioners should become more reflexive about the
lessons learnt from recent and vivid cases of success or failure and, subsequently,
more sceptical and demanding vis-à-vis arguments that pose similarities and
widely applicable lessons to current problems. Secondly, practitioners should
recognize the strong influence of motivational biases affecting potential produ-
cers and consumers of warnings and examine whether such biases are caused by
misaligned internal incentives or external scrutiny structures that could be
altered. Thirdly, it is important to regularly review the allocation of
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responsibilities for risk monitoring among states and international organiz-
ations, as well as the co-ordinating and communication mechanisms between
them to allow for the better integration of relevant knowledge and the manage-
ment of boundary and displacement risks.
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